The ballots are counted and the German people have spoken: For the next four years, Germany will be governed by a center-right coalition between the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP). Why did Germans vote the way they did and what role did economic and foreign policy issues play? What does this mean for German domestic policy? How will foreign policy change under a new foreign minister, presumably Guido Westerwelle (FDP)? And above all, what does this mean for the United States and its transatlantic and global agenda, which includes formidable challenges such as a nuclear Iran, continued violence in Afghanistan, and reforming the financial system? Will Germany remain an ally or will its foreign policy goals differ from the United States?
On October 5, 2009, AICGS will analyze these topics in a conference which will look beyond the election results by presenting an in-depth analysis of the election’s impact on the transatlantic relations. The conference on "The German Elections - A Party System for the Future?" will feature multiple well-respected panelists commenting on the election results and developments within the German party system. Held one week after the elections, this event will focus on the election’s political implications for the parties, the outlook for economic reforms, and expectations for foreign policy. We hope you can join us for this timely event.
To view the event's agenda, please click here.
To RSVP for this event, please click here.
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Monday, September 28, 2009
The Results Are In
The votes have been counted, and result is a black-yellow coalition between Angela Merkel's CDU/CSU and Guido Westerwelle's FDP. Please check back for analysis of the results here on the blog!
Image copyright Der Spiegel.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Live from Berlin
It is about 8:30 in the evening in Germany and I am writing from the Bundespresseamt, as the major party leaders are engaged in an election postmortem on the "Berliner Runde." Of course the final results are not yet in, but everyone (including the party leaders) already have called this one.
And there will be a (partial) change in government, with a likely majority for the CDU/CSU-FDP--even without the much maligned Ueberhangmandate (which will stop the charges of a potentially illegitimate victory for Black/Yellow). Worringly, participation is estimated to have sunk to a low 72%.
The current results are (as of 8:59 PM):
CDU/CSU 33.8% This is less than most surveys were predicting (around 35%), but not bad at all, about 1 % less than 2005. One major reason was another drop in the CSU vote in Bavaria. Of course the CSU is already blaming the FDP for "stealing" second votes. Guido Westerwelle (probably the next foreign minister) reacted critically to this charge. Westerwelle, by the way, appears rather uptight and testy on TV right now. But, Merkel says that she is satisfied with this result and will stay in office.
SPD 23.1% This result (although long predicted) is the worst result for any party since 1949. The party lost 17% of the vote (compared to 2005) in the less than 30 age group; 12% in the 30-44 cohort, but only 5% in the over 60. Steinmeier just announced that he wants to stay on as opposition leader, but we'll see about that. There must be blood! Recriminations already have begun.
FDP 14.5 One the best results in a long time and a clear victory for this party, which will join the government for the first time since 1998 (its longest stint in the opposition since the Federal Republic was founded). Clearly, many Germans split their votes, giving their Zweitstimme to the Liberals. In Baden-Wuerrtemburg, the party gained about 18% of the second votes. This strong result will empower the party to play hardball in the coalition negotiations and to demand even more cabinet posts.
Left Party 12.1% This is a real victory for this party--slightly higher than most of the last polls were predicting. Oskar Lafontaine is clearly happy and is rubbing this result in the face of his old party comrades in the SPD. Even though many analysts think the party will have major challenges retaining unity, this result will be a major motivator to stay together. This result is also an indication that there are still many unhappy folks in the country--especially in the East where they appear entrenched.
Greens 10.5% Clearly, this is a disappointment for the party, even though this is about 2% more than 2005. But, they have lost about 3-4% of what they were polling several weeks ago. I think they had a real problem defining their profile in this political environment. Also, leaders like Trittin and Kuenast appear tired. Renewal is necessary here as well.
Others 5.9% Apparently, the media darling, "Pirate Party" garnered as much as 2% of the vote. Political scientists will have to mull over what this rather high result for other parties indicates.
Personally, I am happy with this outcome. I agree with the Economist that Angie needs to be uncaged. I think Germany needs the kind of reforms that a Black-Yellow government will be able to push through. Moreover, the SPD needs nothing more than a spell in opposition to rebuild itself and to deal with its left flank. The Left Party will have to watch out.
Now the real fun begins with coalition negotiations, a new governmental program (hopefully addressing the policy backlog that the grand coalition necessarily ignored), the internal party bloodlettling (in the SPD, Greens and probably the CSU), and, of course, the analyses by pollsters and political scientists. Certainly, there are many concepts that need to be up-dated and addressed--the death of the catch-all Volkspartei, reform to the arcane electoral system, the deep structural reforms that the country needs.
As Merkel just said at the end of the Berliner Runde (presumably thinking that the microphone was off)--in an exhasuted, but business-like voice: OK. Manager Merkel is ready to get on with things.
--Eric Langenbacher
And there will be a (partial) change in government, with a likely majority for the CDU/CSU-FDP--even without the much maligned Ueberhangmandate (which will stop the charges of a potentially illegitimate victory for Black/Yellow). Worringly, participation is estimated to have sunk to a low 72%.
The current results are (as of 8:59 PM):
CDU/CSU 33.8% This is less than most surveys were predicting (around 35%), but not bad at all, about 1 % less than 2005. One major reason was another drop in the CSU vote in Bavaria. Of course the CSU is already blaming the FDP for "stealing" second votes. Guido Westerwelle (probably the next foreign minister) reacted critically to this charge. Westerwelle, by the way, appears rather uptight and testy on TV right now. But, Merkel says that she is satisfied with this result and will stay in office.
SPD 23.1% This result (although long predicted) is the worst result for any party since 1949. The party lost 17% of the vote (compared to 2005) in the less than 30 age group; 12% in the 30-44 cohort, but only 5% in the over 60. Steinmeier just announced that he wants to stay on as opposition leader, but we'll see about that. There must be blood! Recriminations already have begun.
FDP 14.5 One the best results in a long time and a clear victory for this party, which will join the government for the first time since 1998 (its longest stint in the opposition since the Federal Republic was founded). Clearly, many Germans split their votes, giving their Zweitstimme to the Liberals. In Baden-Wuerrtemburg, the party gained about 18% of the second votes. This strong result will empower the party to play hardball in the coalition negotiations and to demand even more cabinet posts.
Left Party 12.1% This is a real victory for this party--slightly higher than most of the last polls were predicting. Oskar Lafontaine is clearly happy and is rubbing this result in the face of his old party comrades in the SPD. Even though many analysts think the party will have major challenges retaining unity, this result will be a major motivator to stay together. This result is also an indication that there are still many unhappy folks in the country--especially in the East where they appear entrenched.
Greens 10.5% Clearly, this is a disappointment for the party, even though this is about 2% more than 2005. But, they have lost about 3-4% of what they were polling several weeks ago. I think they had a real problem defining their profile in this political environment. Also, leaders like Trittin and Kuenast appear tired. Renewal is necessary here as well.
Others 5.9% Apparently, the media darling, "Pirate Party" garnered as much as 2% of the vote. Political scientists will have to mull over what this rather high result for other parties indicates.
Personally, I am happy with this outcome. I agree with the Economist that Angie needs to be uncaged. I think Germany needs the kind of reforms that a Black-Yellow government will be able to push through. Moreover, the SPD needs nothing more than a spell in opposition to rebuild itself and to deal with its left flank. The Left Party will have to watch out.
Now the real fun begins with coalition negotiations, a new governmental program (hopefully addressing the policy backlog that the grand coalition necessarily ignored), the internal party bloodlettling (in the SPD, Greens and probably the CSU), and, of course, the analyses by pollsters and political scientists. Certainly, there are many concepts that need to be up-dated and addressed--the death of the catch-all Volkspartei, reform to the arcane electoral system, the deep structural reforms that the country needs.
As Merkel just said at the end of the Berliner Runde (presumably thinking that the microphone was off)--in an exhasuted, but business-like voice: OK. Manager Merkel is ready to get on with things.
--Eric Langenbacher
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Election Day Notes of a Proud Political Junkie
So, this is election day. Finally. Being both a political junkie and the proud product of our post-war West German democracy (even granting myself the occasional bout of that specific, timid patriotism that Germans have developed for themselves and which they still find so difficult to embrace), election day always gives me a slightly elevated feeling of eminence, duty and suspense. I imagine this feeling to be the mini-mini-version of the kick that supposedly gives politicians the adrenaline they live off.
With this peculiar emotion serving as the backdrop, here are my final notes before the results will be rolling in on Sunday night.
1. Yes, it was boring
There have been numerous attempts to counter the common perception that this was a boring campaign. I think they are misguided. The widespread perception that this was a dull campaign wasn't just the product of media framing, as was obviously suggested by some pundit at a conference the other day (see Friday's blog entry by Eric Langenbacher). It was simply the truth.
Political pundits are never bored about any campaign because they don't need any content to get excited. All they need is the daily tactical manoeuvring of parties and candidates, a steady flow of minor scandals, and of course the latest poll numbers. For them (and this includes myself), this campaign was a feast because that was all there was.
However, for the regular Joe in the street who couldn't care less about petty inside-the-beltway-babble, this was indeed the most boring campaign he can remember. It was also the campaign that gave him the least orientation and guidance as to where he should check the ballot this Sunday.
To be sure, there were many attempts to insert some substance into the debate -- tax policies, the minimum wage, nuclear energy, banker bonuses, you name it. But nothing caught any traction. All issues disappeared after just a few days in the limelight (and sometimes even quicker). A curious phenomenon that deserves a few closer looks once all this is over.
2. Merkel's campaign triumph
There is already one winner in this election, and it's Angela Merkel. Her triumph is substantial: she got exactly the kind of campaign she wanted: very little conflict, very little substance, no promises.
It remains to be seen whether this will produce a result she could rightfully call a victory. But her triumph lies in the fact that none of her contenders, neither Steinmeier and the SPD, nor the Greens, the Free Democrats, or the Linkspartei, were able to undermine her strategy. None of them managed to drag her out of her corner and to seriously challenge her presidential pose. "It was all so mediocre", Derek Scally, the Irish Times' very perceptive and clever Berlin correspondent told me during an extended late-morning breakfast session in Kreuzberg on Saturday. "She just got away with it."
But this triumph can very quickly turn into a problem for the chancellor. "If this strategy does not produce the intended result, there is no-one she can blame except herself," Scally said. He's right. A Merkel campaign it was from beginning to end. And Merkel will harvest what she has sown -- one way or the other.
3. Good bye, old republic
The meaninglessness of the campaign and the fact that a second edition of the grand coalition looks increasingly likely are witnesses to the end of Germany as we know it. The boringness might mark the end of the old ideological battles, as Berthold Kohler suggests in Saturday's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. It certainly marks the end of the old party system which was the hallmark of the Bonn republic. It is evidence of the utter stability of German democracy that this system, built around two Volksparteien, survived for so long after it got transplanted from West Germany into the freshly unified country.
Now, 20 years after the fact, it simply does not serve its main purpose any longer, i.e. the fabrication of clear majorities and stable governments. The post-unification era is over. The new republic will emerge in the upcoming years -- probably rather sooner than later. And the process is already under way. Both the SPD and the CDU will be confronted with disastrous election results. Returns between 25 and 35 per cent are a far stretch from the self-proclaimed aspirations of catch-all parties (and there are no brilliant party ideologist and strategists, such as old CDU's Heiner Geissler or old SPD's Peter Glotz anywhere on the horizon to rise to the occasion and redefine what it means to be Volkspartei.) The other three parties have stabilized themselves at roughly equal levels somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent.
It's now common talk that this will lead to new, formerly unthinkable coalitions, and it's true. But few people realize that this will also change Germany and its political culture beyond recognition. Let's not be nostalgic about the old order of things. It served the nation well. Now something new is on the horizon. We don't know what it will look like. So allow your humble blogger a personal remark on this election day that means so much to him: let's make it an even better Germany than the great one we have lived in over the last decades. So that president Horst Köhler is proven right: Germany's best days are still ahead of her.
PS.: a good first step would be to go out there and vote, everybody!
With this peculiar emotion serving as the backdrop, here are my final notes before the results will be rolling in on Sunday night.
1. Yes, it was boring
There have been numerous attempts to counter the common perception that this was a boring campaign. I think they are misguided. The widespread perception that this was a dull campaign wasn't just the product of media framing, as was obviously suggested by some pundit at a conference the other day (see Friday's blog entry by Eric Langenbacher). It was simply the truth.
Political pundits are never bored about any campaign because they don't need any content to get excited. All they need is the daily tactical manoeuvring of parties and candidates, a steady flow of minor scandals, and of course the latest poll numbers. For them (and this includes myself), this campaign was a feast because that was all there was.
However, for the regular Joe in the street who couldn't care less about petty inside-the-beltway-babble, this was indeed the most boring campaign he can remember. It was also the campaign that gave him the least orientation and guidance as to where he should check the ballot this Sunday.
To be sure, there were many attempts to insert some substance into the debate -- tax policies, the minimum wage, nuclear energy, banker bonuses, you name it. But nothing caught any traction. All issues disappeared after just a few days in the limelight (and sometimes even quicker). A curious phenomenon that deserves a few closer looks once all this is over.
2. Merkel's campaign triumph
There is already one winner in this election, and it's Angela Merkel. Her triumph is substantial: she got exactly the kind of campaign she wanted: very little conflict, very little substance, no promises.
It remains to be seen whether this will produce a result she could rightfully call a victory. But her triumph lies in the fact that none of her contenders, neither Steinmeier and the SPD, nor the Greens, the Free Democrats, or the Linkspartei, were able to undermine her strategy. None of them managed to drag her out of her corner and to seriously challenge her presidential pose. "It was all so mediocre", Derek Scally, the Irish Times' very perceptive and clever Berlin correspondent told me during an extended late-morning breakfast session in Kreuzberg on Saturday. "She just got away with it."
But this triumph can very quickly turn into a problem for the chancellor. "If this strategy does not produce the intended result, there is no-one she can blame except herself," Scally said. He's right. A Merkel campaign it was from beginning to end. And Merkel will harvest what she has sown -- one way or the other.
3. Good bye, old republic
The meaninglessness of the campaign and the fact that a second edition of the grand coalition looks increasingly likely are witnesses to the end of Germany as we know it. The boringness might mark the end of the old ideological battles, as Berthold Kohler suggests in Saturday's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. It certainly marks the end of the old party system which was the hallmark of the Bonn republic. It is evidence of the utter stability of German democracy that this system, built around two Volksparteien, survived for so long after it got transplanted from West Germany into the freshly unified country.
Now, 20 years after the fact, it simply does not serve its main purpose any longer, i.e. the fabrication of clear majorities and stable governments. The post-unification era is over. The new republic will emerge in the upcoming years -- probably rather sooner than later. And the process is already under way. Both the SPD and the CDU will be confronted with disastrous election results. Returns between 25 and 35 per cent are a far stretch from the self-proclaimed aspirations of catch-all parties (and there are no brilliant party ideologist and strategists, such as old CDU's Heiner Geissler or old SPD's Peter Glotz anywhere on the horizon to rise to the occasion and redefine what it means to be Volkspartei.) The other three parties have stabilized themselves at roughly equal levels somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent.
It's now common talk that this will lead to new, formerly unthinkable coalitions, and it's true. But few people realize that this will also change Germany and its political culture beyond recognition. Let's not be nostalgic about the old order of things. It served the nation well. Now something new is on the horizon. We don't know what it will look like. So allow your humble blogger a personal remark on this election day that means so much to him: let's make it an even better Germany than the great one we have lived in over the last decades. So that president Horst Köhler is proven right: Germany's best days are still ahead of her.
PS.: a good first step would be to go out there and vote, everybody!
The Final Stretch
Today, I attended the last big CDU rally in Berlin at the Arena in Treptow. The venue was full, but the average age of the audience was probably about 60 years old (I don't know what this says about the CDU's or Germany's demographics). In any case, Merkel arrived shortly after the event began and engaged in a rather weird "chat" with Ronald Pofalla and two moderators. Then we went live to Munich and there was a casual back-and-forth with Horst Seehofer at a CSU rally. Everybody talked about how much they love each other and can't wait for a positive election result.
After an extremely cheesy rock back interlude ("Superfrau"), Merkel took the stage alone and delivered what was supposed to be a rousing campaign speech. Yet, the lack of an enthusuiastic response was palpable. Perhaps it had something to do with the age of the audience, suboptimal staging, or Merkel's visible exhaustion (she did just get back from the G20 Summit). Maybe Merkel's lack of charisma was once again evident--or maybe this lackluster response was symbolic of the entire campaign. In any case, the noise level did not really rise and the applause was only sporadic.
Substantively, I thought Merkel was quite good. She spoke about the need for global economic rules ("exporting soziale Marktwirtschaft"--a new German nationalism?) and the necessity of never again letting such an economic and financial crisis occur. Retaining and creating jobs and returning to pre-crisis levels of propserity were major emphases. She also spent quite a bit of time talking about family and educational policy. Interestingly, she did not directly attack any of her challengers (she didn't even mention Steinmeier by name). She mentioned various anniversaries, especially the fall of the Wall and noted that the CDU was always for unification.
Her most frequent points, however, had to do with the necessity of maximizing the CDU-CSU's share of the vote--especially Zweitstimme (earlier she quipped that her job is contingent on these second votes). She implored people to vote "simply," implying that vote splitting and other strategic forms of voting are highly dangerous this year. Towards the end of her appearance, she mentioned the desirability of a Black-Yellow coalition--but in my opinion, she really de-empahsized this possible outcome--many have long thought she would prefer another grand coalition--at the least she is hedging. She also mentioned the high pecentage of undecided voters and thus the necessity of vigorous last-minute efforts (although as the pollsters noted yesterday, higher levels of turnout usually benefit leftist parties).
The uncertainty that I blogged about yesterday was evident in Merkel's speech. It is a rare occurence that a major democratic leader has to lecture voters (repeatedly) about the intricacies of the electoral system. But, she is right to be worried. The last polls released by Forsa show the left and right camps even at 47% and the CDU down from an average of 35% to 33%.
Let the voting begin ...
--Eric Langenbacher
After an extremely cheesy rock back interlude ("Superfrau"), Merkel took the stage alone and delivered what was supposed to be a rousing campaign speech. Yet, the lack of an enthusuiastic response was palpable. Perhaps it had something to do with the age of the audience, suboptimal staging, or Merkel's visible exhaustion (she did just get back from the G20 Summit). Maybe Merkel's lack of charisma was once again evident--or maybe this lackluster response was symbolic of the entire campaign. In any case, the noise level did not really rise and the applause was only sporadic.
Substantively, I thought Merkel was quite good. She spoke about the need for global economic rules ("exporting soziale Marktwirtschaft"--a new German nationalism?) and the necessity of never again letting such an economic and financial crisis occur. Retaining and creating jobs and returning to pre-crisis levels of propserity were major emphases. She also spent quite a bit of time talking about family and educational policy. Interestingly, she did not directly attack any of her challengers (she didn't even mention Steinmeier by name). She mentioned various anniversaries, especially the fall of the Wall and noted that the CDU was always for unification.
Her most frequent points, however, had to do with the necessity of maximizing the CDU-CSU's share of the vote--especially Zweitstimme (earlier she quipped that her job is contingent on these second votes). She implored people to vote "simply," implying that vote splitting and other strategic forms of voting are highly dangerous this year. Towards the end of her appearance, she mentioned the desirability of a Black-Yellow coalition--but in my opinion, she really de-empahsized this possible outcome--many have long thought she would prefer another grand coalition--at the least she is hedging. She also mentioned the high pecentage of undecided voters and thus the necessity of vigorous last-minute efforts (although as the pollsters noted yesterday, higher levels of turnout usually benefit leftist parties).
The uncertainty that I blogged about yesterday was evident in Merkel's speech. It is a rare occurence that a major democratic leader has to lecture voters (repeatedly) about the intricacies of the electoral system. But, she is right to be worried. The last polls released by Forsa show the left and right camps even at 47% and the CDU down from an average of 35% to 33%.
Let the voting begin ...
--Eric Langenbacher
Friday, September 25, 2009
A Nailbiter
I have been in Germany since Thursday on a study tour organized by the International Association for the Study of German Politics and the DAAD. There are 54 academics, mainly from the UK and USA here, engaged in a variety of election-related activities--political rallies, one-on-one meetings with politicians and roundtables with electoral researchers and pollsters. Of course, the best thing about being in Berlin is the opportunity to absorb the Stimmung in the last days of the campaign.
And what a difference a few days makes. All of a sudden, the "most boring campaign" in living memory--likened to a city council election in Würzburg by Roger Cohen in the International Herald Tribune--has become interesting. With the polls tightening, the outcome is not assured. And when things are so tight, all prognoses are within the margin of error. The big topic here is whether the CDU/CSU-FDP will win a majority of seats thanks to Überhangmandate, but will lose the popular vote. I also think that we need to have be skeptical towards these polling results--we should not forget that the polling institutes overestimated the actual result for the CDU last time by 5-6%.
But, according to the folks from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen and Infratest dimap, a Black- Yellow government is still the most likely outcome, even though no one knows how crucial the Überhangmandate will be. Moreover, the % of undecided voters is at an all-time high--at 19% of the electorate (11% in 2005). The pollsters offered up several tantalizing tidbits of information:
° The incidence of vote splitting--voters choosing one party for the territorial representative and another for the all-important party list vote has continued to increase--to 27% this year (22% in 2005). Richard Hilmer from Infratest dimap thinks that vote splitting, particularly CDU voters giving their second vote to the FDP was responsible for the unexpected outcome in 2005. This situation may recur this year.
° Yvonne Schroth from Forschungsgruppen Wahlen notes that never has there been such a volatile electorate, with an unprecedented level of readiness to vote across ideological divides. For example, 24% of CDU voters would vote for the Greens (unthinkable 20 years ago). Still, 15% of voters are unsure about their choice on Sunday (up from 11% at this point in 2005).
° Viola Neu from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation concluded that she just doesn't know what indicators or factors will matter for the final result--too much is in flux this time around. Only 25% of the German electorate are still Stammwähler, meaning that 3/4 are floating voters. She also thinks that it is scandalous that a peripheral topic--the Überhangmandate--have taken on so much importance. She points out that all of the media attention was generated by an esoteric mathematical academic model. She also asserted that the media are responsible for the widespread belief that this election has been boring and content-less. Apparently, media figures vacationed in Berlin when everyone else was abroad in August, concluding that the election was boring at that time, and, in a classic example of media framing and narrativizing, the reputation has stuck.
° Wolfgang Gibowski thinks that the SPD needs to return to opposition to maintain the overall stability of the German system. He thinks that the country needs two catch-all Volksparteien and if the SPD stays in power in a continuation of the grand coalition, it will continue to lose support and will cease to be a Volkspartei.
There was quite a bit of talk about the Überhangmandate. Reinhard Bütikofer of the Greens said that if Black-Yellow gets its majority this way, it would be as scandalous as the 2000 U.S. Presidential election result and, thus, fundamentally illegitimate. (But he also said that the only reason a Black-Green coalition has been working in Hamburg is because von Beust is gay). Hilmer noted that reform and modifications to the electoral laws will be on the political agenda, especially if the winners of a majority of seats lost the popular vote.
There is obviously much more to report and I will check in again tomorrow. But, finally the election has become interesting and we will all be up late on Sunday waiting for the final results of this nailbiter.
--Eric Langenbacher
And what a difference a few days makes. All of a sudden, the "most boring campaign" in living memory--likened to a city council election in Würzburg by Roger Cohen in the International Herald Tribune--has become interesting. With the polls tightening, the outcome is not assured. And when things are so tight, all prognoses are within the margin of error. The big topic here is whether the CDU/CSU-FDP will win a majority of seats thanks to Überhangmandate, but will lose the popular vote. I also think that we need to have be skeptical towards these polling results--we should not forget that the polling institutes overestimated the actual result for the CDU last time by 5-6%.
But, according to the folks from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen and Infratest dimap, a Black- Yellow government is still the most likely outcome, even though no one knows how crucial the Überhangmandate will be. Moreover, the % of undecided voters is at an all-time high--at 19% of the electorate (11% in 2005). The pollsters offered up several tantalizing tidbits of information:
° The incidence of vote splitting--voters choosing one party for the territorial representative and another for the all-important party list vote has continued to increase--to 27% this year (22% in 2005). Richard Hilmer from Infratest dimap thinks that vote splitting, particularly CDU voters giving their second vote to the FDP was responsible for the unexpected outcome in 2005. This situation may recur this year.
° Yvonne Schroth from Forschungsgruppen Wahlen notes that never has there been such a volatile electorate, with an unprecedented level of readiness to vote across ideological divides. For example, 24% of CDU voters would vote for the Greens (unthinkable 20 years ago). Still, 15% of voters are unsure about their choice on Sunday (up from 11% at this point in 2005).
° Viola Neu from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation concluded that she just doesn't know what indicators or factors will matter for the final result--too much is in flux this time around. Only 25% of the German electorate are still Stammwähler, meaning that 3/4 are floating voters. She also thinks that it is scandalous that a peripheral topic--the Überhangmandate--have taken on so much importance. She points out that all of the media attention was generated by an esoteric mathematical academic model. She also asserted that the media are responsible for the widespread belief that this election has been boring and content-less. Apparently, media figures vacationed in Berlin when everyone else was abroad in August, concluding that the election was boring at that time, and, in a classic example of media framing and narrativizing, the reputation has stuck.
° Wolfgang Gibowski thinks that the SPD needs to return to opposition to maintain the overall stability of the German system. He thinks that the country needs two catch-all Volksparteien and if the SPD stays in power in a continuation of the grand coalition, it will continue to lose support and will cease to be a Volkspartei.
There was quite a bit of talk about the Überhangmandate. Reinhard Bütikofer of the Greens said that if Black-Yellow gets its majority this way, it would be as scandalous as the 2000 U.S. Presidential election result and, thus, fundamentally illegitimate. (But he also said that the only reason a Black-Green coalition has been working in Hamburg is because von Beust is gay). Hilmer noted that reform and modifications to the electoral laws will be on the political agenda, especially if the winners of a majority of seats lost the popular vote.
There is obviously much more to report and I will check in again tomorrow. But, finally the election has become interesting and we will all be up late on Sunday waiting for the final results of this nailbiter.
--Eric Langenbacher
Where to Win the Race – Electoral Incentive Systems in the U.S. and in Germany
To reach out for voters is at the core of a political campaign. Where and when this is done is different in Germany and the US. One reason is of course that in German campaigns much less money is spent. But there are other reasons, too and the one I want to talk about today is a rather strong incentive: the electoral system. The US majority system leads to different campaign styles than the German proportional representation.
A US presidential campaign is strongly focused on battleground/swing states, because a majority in a state usually brings all electoral votes. So it makes sense to invest huge amounts of money to gain the few crucial percentage points in e.g. Florida to win the majority there although the same two percentage points would have been way cheaper in a New England state for example. But in the latter the majority would not have been affected.
In Germany, due to PR, there is no need to invest in a majority in a certain state (except for the CSU, which is campaigning only in one state). So in Germany there are no Battleground states.
Though, this year we had something that comes at least near to battleground states. Prior to the Bundestagswahl there were elections in several states. But not the electoral outcome itself is interesting for the Bundestag election campaigns, as the results do not affect the allocation of the seats in the Bundestag directly. It works rather like the Iowa caucus. A winner there may gain crucial momentum for the campaign. (Jörg Siegmund has written about it.)
But another part of the German electoral system is majoritarian: the district vote. Roughly half of the members of the Bundestag get their ticket through a majority in a district. The incentives here are the same as in the US: the majority wins and thus investment in the last few percentage points is well worth it. At least for the candidates. But parties usually do not really care about who is elected directly because the number of seats a party gains is determined by proportional representation (with the exception of the surplus seats). So in the US there is not only a local, but also a federal interest in district races, because those races affect the majority in congress. That is different in Germany. Typically the major interest is in the share of the proportional vote, not in the district outcome.
But as Jörg Siegmund has pointed out, the surplus seats may be crucial this election. In states where party A has a good chance to win surplus seats, party B has a strong incentive to go for district mandates, as every single district which party B wins, will eliminate one extra (!) seat party A might gain. Here it is: a party incentive for actively supporting a campaign in a certain district. And, as gerrymandering is not (yet) as affluent in Germany as it is in the US, there are quite a lot competitive districts. 70 out of 299 were won with less than a 5 percentage points lead in 2005.
So for German parties within this election it makes perfect sense to work the competitive districts. Perhaps this is the last time around, as the possibility of surplus seats will hopefully have vanished in the next election. The incentives for winning direct seats then remain mainly with the candidates.
But in my eyes it would be a problem if German parties focused only on the proportional vote. A district candidate can be a standard bearer for a party. And as personalization is very effective, there is a high chance that a candidate, who scores a good result for himself, may also boost the electoral outcome for his party. So national parties should invest in district campaigning in some form even without a chance for surplus seats or incentives by the electoral system.
--Matthias Kuhn
A US presidential campaign is strongly focused on battleground/swing states, because a majority in a state usually brings all electoral votes. So it makes sense to invest huge amounts of money to gain the few crucial percentage points in e.g. Florida to win the majority there although the same two percentage points would have been way cheaper in a New England state for example. But in the latter the majority would not have been affected.
In Germany, due to PR, there is no need to invest in a majority in a certain state (except for the CSU, which is campaigning only in one state). So in Germany there are no Battleground states.
Though, this year we had something that comes at least near to battleground states. Prior to the Bundestagswahl there were elections in several states. But not the electoral outcome itself is interesting for the Bundestag election campaigns, as the results do not affect the allocation of the seats in the Bundestag directly. It works rather like the Iowa caucus. A winner there may gain crucial momentum for the campaign. (Jörg Siegmund has written about it.)
But another part of the German electoral system is majoritarian: the district vote. Roughly half of the members of the Bundestag get their ticket through a majority in a district. The incentives here are the same as in the US: the majority wins and thus investment in the last few percentage points is well worth it. At least for the candidates. But parties usually do not really care about who is elected directly because the number of seats a party gains is determined by proportional representation (with the exception of the surplus seats). So in the US there is not only a local, but also a federal interest in district races, because those races affect the majority in congress. That is different in Germany. Typically the major interest is in the share of the proportional vote, not in the district outcome.
But as Jörg Siegmund has pointed out, the surplus seats may be crucial this election. In states where party A has a good chance to win surplus seats, party B has a strong incentive to go for district mandates, as every single district which party B wins, will eliminate one extra (!) seat party A might gain. Here it is: a party incentive for actively supporting a campaign in a certain district. And, as gerrymandering is not (yet) as affluent in Germany as it is in the US, there are quite a lot competitive districts. 70 out of 299 were won with less than a 5 percentage points lead in 2005.
So for German parties within this election it makes perfect sense to work the competitive districts. Perhaps this is the last time around, as the possibility of surplus seats will hopefully have vanished in the next election. The incentives for winning direct seats then remain mainly with the candidates.
But in my eyes it would be a problem if German parties focused only on the proportional vote. A district candidate can be a standard bearer for a party. And as personalization is very effective, there is a high chance that a candidate, who scores a good result for himself, may also boost the electoral outcome for his party. So national parties should invest in district campaigning in some form even without a chance for surplus seats or incentives by the electoral system.
--Matthias Kuhn
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