As the journalists of the world unite in Berlin for a quick glimpse at the wonders and oddities of the German electoral process ("Überhangmandate" easily being the total favourite of everybody I have talked to), one question is being asked more frequently again: What does all this mean for German foreign policy?
The quick answer would be: not much. There does exist a pretty stable cross-party consensus on fundamentals of Germany's external relations: Firm embeddedness in the EU and NATO, good relations with Washington, pragmatic ones with Moscow, affectionate ones (if possible) with France. All that topped off with a good moral commitment to the United Nations. With the exception of Die Linke (which is still dreaming about dissolving NATO), there is no viable force in the country that wants to go elsewhere. So it really would not make much of a difference whether Guido Westerwelle or Steinmeier will be the next foreign minister. Consequently, the campaign remained silent on any foreign policy issue. The simple truth is that, with the exception of the Linkspartei, no party deemed foreign policy a worth-while battle ground to generate votes on.
Some observers might find this boring predictability reassuring as it makes Germany a more reliable partner, and there is certainly a grain of truth in this. But behind this big consensus lurks a substantial danger. The reason is that most people in government, practically all think tankers, a majority of the more level-headed journalists, and even a handful of members of the Bundestag realize that the current German foreign policy posture is not sustainable. All of them know that Germany's new book-keepers approach to the EU, its disappointing lack of intellectual commitment to NATO, and its general disregard for its own size and the responsibilities that come with it won't be sufficient for what lies ahead. With America being relatively weaker and with the demand for global stabilizing service increasing, Germany will soon be faced with more requests for money, troops, and leadership, none of which is in ample supply.
It is understandable that foreign policy was left out of the campaign. The problem lies in the fact that no political leader and no party program is bold enough to confront the widespread German parochialism in order to prepare the people for the uncomfortable times ahead. But soon enough, reality will bite. The Afghanistan issue was only postponed, the Iran problem is approaching decision time, a new strategic concept for NATO is under way, the EU will have to partially re-invent itself no matter whether the Lisbon treaty enters into force or not. Piracy won't disappear any time soon, and neither will fundamentalist terrorism. In most of these fields, Germany is being perceived as a follower, not as a leader.
The German political elite will at some point have to explain all this to the people, not only because they owe it to the electorate but also because only the truth will buy them the political manoeuvring space they will need at crunch time. If they remain silent, they should be reminded of Humphrey Bogart's famous advice for Ingrid Bergman in the end of "Casablanca": You'll regret it. Maybe not today. Maybe not tomorrow, but soon and for the rest of your life.
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Internet Campaigning 2009: Leap Forward in Quality, Running the Spot in User Statistics
Barack Obama’s legendary campaign in last year’s race for the White House was called the first ‘internet election’, as it mobilized volunteers at grass-roots level and raised the bulk of funds via the digital war room ‘myBarackObama.com’. It was on myBO, where the enthusiasm for America’s first internet president took its starting point. Hence, German campaign managers have been trying hard to copy Obama’s successful online strategy. They had a long way to go: In 1998, they were addressed as “Neanderthals of cyberspace” (Foerster, U.: Neandertaler im Cyberspace, in: Der Spiegel, September 28, 1998) as their first attempts to internet campaigning went awry. Still in 2005 online campaigning was pale in comparison to TV ads or hustings. Campaign homepages presented mostly written information on candidates and political programs; top-down communication was standard.
In the 09-battle for the German Bundestag, however, they manage a great leap forward:
The ‘big five’ of Germany’s party scene (CDU, SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, FPD, Die Linke) attach decisive importance to the internet, they allocate more funds and campaign staff to the digital channel. They set up a complex website architecture on the internet, reaching out from party homepages to mirco target groups via Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, etc. and even operating own social networks.

Angela Merkel on Facebook

Networking platform of Bündnis90/Die Grünen
Their campaigns offer the full range of up-to-date multimedia applications, such as vodcasts and animated design.

SPD-Homepage featuring the blogspot of chancellor candidate Steinmeier
Typically, they engage in a web 2.0-mode of communication, publish laid-back blogs and stage private life on Twitter. User generated content is welcomed on their websites, too. Interactivity rules, actually: Volunteers at grass-roots level are involved in program debates, virtual testimonials, mobile campaign reports, and mailings to political opponents. Fund raising plays a prominent role on the internet as well. On- and offline campaigning is knit together: Web volunteers are supposed to support their party demonstrating or positioning election posters in real life.
Comparing the performance of the above mentioned German parties,
Bündnis90/Die Grünen clearly gain the lead in the internet election. They strike the right note in addressing the digital natives and prospective voters likewise. Their website architecture comes as close as possible to the single point of entry-benchmark, their participatory offers hit the creative mark, grass roots are effectively instructed. The party’s roots in the bottom-up and participatory environmental movement may partly account for this success.
Concerning adequate style of communication and mobilization of volunteers FDP and Die Linke are scoring well, too; while their homepages rather relate to web 1.0, multimedia-based content is relatively scarce.
CDU and SPD, in turn, have a tough time adjusting to the style of web 2.0 – their language is sometimes too chumming up, sometimes too authoritarian. Moreover, the grand coalition parties suffer from the resentment of the digital community caused by unpopular internet legislation (‘Netzsperrengesetz’). On their homepages, however, the two parties offer a top-notch multimedia-based, dynamic design; they display the full scope of innovative participatory options. Moreover, they strike a balance between specific targeting of voters and limited points of entry.
Notwithstanding the great leap forward in quality of online communication, the current efforts will not make history as the first German ‘internet election’ as the response of voters is only marginal: None of the five parties has attracted more than 25.000 supporters on external social networks, no party-owned platform counts more than 35.000 volunteers. Only 20 percent of politically interested German users are planning to visit the homepage of a party or politician before Election Day. Compared to an electorate of roughly 60 million and an audience of fourteen million for the chancellor candidates’ TV debate the online campaigns won’t carry too much weight for the election’s outcome. In fact, the internet comes in second as a medium for political information. However, German users do not stop by campaigning spots, they still rely on websites of newspapers and TV stations or chat politics with their friends in social networks. In short, German parties cannot do without online campaigning in 2009, but users can do on the internet without the parties.
For more information about Online Campaigning in the battle for the German Bundestag see also the respective CAP Working Paper (German version available only).
--Kathi Wimmer
In the 09-battle for the German Bundestag, however, they manage a great leap forward:
The ‘big five’ of Germany’s party scene (CDU, SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, FPD, Die Linke) attach decisive importance to the internet, they allocate more funds and campaign staff to the digital channel. They set up a complex website architecture on the internet, reaching out from party homepages to mirco target groups via Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, etc. and even operating own social networks.

Angela Merkel on Facebook

Networking platform of Bündnis90/Die Grünen
Their campaigns offer the full range of up-to-date multimedia applications, such as vodcasts and animated design.

SPD-Homepage featuring the blogspot of chancellor candidate Steinmeier
Typically, they engage in a web 2.0-mode of communication, publish laid-back blogs and stage private life on Twitter. User generated content is welcomed on their websites, too. Interactivity rules, actually: Volunteers at grass-roots level are involved in program debates, virtual testimonials, mobile campaign reports, and mailings to political opponents. Fund raising plays a prominent role on the internet as well. On- and offline campaigning is knit together: Web volunteers are supposed to support their party demonstrating or positioning election posters in real life.
Comparing the performance of the above mentioned German parties,
Bündnis90/Die Grünen clearly gain the lead in the internet election. They strike the right note in addressing the digital natives and prospective voters likewise. Their website architecture comes as close as possible to the single point of entry-benchmark, their participatory offers hit the creative mark, grass roots are effectively instructed. The party’s roots in the bottom-up and participatory environmental movement may partly account for this success.
Concerning adequate style of communication and mobilization of volunteers FDP and Die Linke are scoring well, too; while their homepages rather relate to web 1.0, multimedia-based content is relatively scarce.
CDU and SPD, in turn, have a tough time adjusting to the style of web 2.0 – their language is sometimes too chumming up, sometimes too authoritarian. Moreover, the grand coalition parties suffer from the resentment of the digital community caused by unpopular internet legislation (‘Netzsperrengesetz’). On their homepages, however, the two parties offer a top-notch multimedia-based, dynamic design; they display the full scope of innovative participatory options. Moreover, they strike a balance between specific targeting of voters and limited points of entry.
Notwithstanding the great leap forward in quality of online communication, the current efforts will not make history as the first German ‘internet election’ as the response of voters is only marginal: None of the five parties has attracted more than 25.000 supporters on external social networks, no party-owned platform counts more than 35.000 volunteers. Only 20 percent of politically interested German users are planning to visit the homepage of a party or politician before Election Day. Compared to an electorate of roughly 60 million and an audience of fourteen million for the chancellor candidates’ TV debate the online campaigns won’t carry too much weight for the election’s outcome. In fact, the internet comes in second as a medium for political information. However, German users do not stop by campaigning spots, they still rely on websites of newspapers and TV stations or chat politics with their friends in social networks. In short, German parties cannot do without online campaigning in 2009, but users can do on the internet without the parties.
For more information about Online Campaigning in the battle for the German Bundestag see also the respective CAP Working Paper (German version available only).
--Kathi Wimmer
New Media in German and U.S. Campaigns
I have long thought that U.S. President Barack Obama has been committing one of cardinal sins of political life--actually believing his own rhetoric. And the degree to which much of the American and global media aid him in this process, taking what he says as the gospel truth, never ceases to amaze me. One such belief is Obama's "magisterial" use of the Internet and social networking sites in particular, largely credited with handing him victory last year.
This belief seems to be the standard to which the German parties and politicians are held--in a pseudo Marxist "the more advanced country shows the less advanced a glimpse of the future." Certainly, this is the gist of a recent Washington Post article as well as blog posts here and elsewhere about the German "Internet Manifesto." Conventional wisdom is that Americans have started to exploit fully the potential of Internet connectivity and the Germans--as in so many other areas--are woefully behind the curve. Despite the high overall number of Germans using the Internet, the number using it for political purposes is quite low. (Although I don't understand why all new media attention is focused on the Internet and no one ever mentions the much greater use of cell phones in Germany and Europe compared to the United States). Moreover, when Germans do go on-line they are overwhelmingly getting information from the mainstream media or the parties' own sites. Only very few are using social network applications to disseminate information or their own opinions.
But what was the reality in the 2008 U.S. election campaign? According to a Pew Study, 18% of Internet users actively used an online forum; 83% in the 18-24 age group had a social networking profile and 2/3 of such individuals engaged in political activity; 1/3 Internet users forwarded political content to others. Interestingly, McCain supporters were more likely to go on-line, but as expected, Obama supporters were more likely to use the potential of social networking, and, all importantly, were more likely to donate money on-line.
So far, conventional wisdom is supported--the Obama campaign exploited the potential of the Internet especially for fundraising purposes and within the youngest political cohorts. Nevertheless, there are several counterpoints.
* Despite perceptions, there was a (slight) decline in the number of eligible voters who actually voted in 2008 compared to 2004 (See USA Today). Although the overall number of voters increased by 5 million, they were almost all minorities, especially African Americans. And, according to Pew, only 8% of all political internet users are African Americans (11% of the population). Thus, it is unclear that the Obama campaign's use of the Internet was crucial in motivating minority voters to go to the polls.
* Only 49% (up from 47% in 2004) of the much ballyhooed 18-24 age group voted. Under-30 voters (2:1 for Obama) were not critical to the result, except arguably in North Carolina and Indiana.
* Finally, all such studies have shown that political users of the Internet rapidly are moving away from websites with no point of view to those that reinforce their own political predisposition--preaching to the converted.
In my view, these findings make the parallels or lessons for German campaigns much less valid. I might even go so far to say that current U.S. trends are far from welcome or desirable. First, the youthful groups of voters (in both countries) most likely to use social networking sites are the least likely to vote and are not decisive for outcomes. Second, increased political Internet use is exacerbating political polarization and general nastiness. Indeed, there are real advantages to the much-derided "mainstream media" with real journalistic professionals maintaining their gatekeeping role and making efforts to achieve balance.
Third, I have not even mentioned the whole debate regarding "grassroots" versus "astroturf"--and the mounting evidence that the Obama campaign conveyed the illusion of bottom-up participation, but actually rather strongly controlled the message and used such technologies as another way of exerting top-down influence. If this is indeed the case, then the German parties' usage of the Internet is already up to "advanced" standards. Finally, the one real advantage that Obama had with the Internet--fundraising--is much, much less important in Germany in light of the generous public financing regime. In the U.S., the Internet has made the collection of money much easier and is helping to exacerbate the campaign finance inflation rate.
Thus, we ought to treat "Internet Manifestos" with a hefty dose of skepticism. At the least, we ought to subject assertions--that the Internet was the secret to Obama's success and that the anachronistic Germans should get with it--to real scrutiny. Perhaps the Internet is not the re-democratizing panacea that its acolytes have made it seem. Maybe there are advantages to a more old-school media approach and campaign style that the German parties still embody.
--Eric Langenbacher
This belief seems to be the standard to which the German parties and politicians are held--in a pseudo Marxist "the more advanced country shows the less advanced a glimpse of the future." Certainly, this is the gist of a recent Washington Post article as well as blog posts here and elsewhere about the German "Internet Manifesto." Conventional wisdom is that Americans have started to exploit fully the potential of Internet connectivity and the Germans--as in so many other areas--are woefully behind the curve. Despite the high overall number of Germans using the Internet, the number using it for political purposes is quite low. (Although I don't understand why all new media attention is focused on the Internet and no one ever mentions the much greater use of cell phones in Germany and Europe compared to the United States). Moreover, when Germans do go on-line they are overwhelmingly getting information from the mainstream media or the parties' own sites. Only very few are using social network applications to disseminate information or their own opinions.
But what was the reality in the 2008 U.S. election campaign? According to a Pew Study, 18% of Internet users actively used an online forum; 83% in the 18-24 age group had a social networking profile and 2/3 of such individuals engaged in political activity; 1/3 Internet users forwarded political content to others. Interestingly, McCain supporters were more likely to go on-line, but as expected, Obama supporters were more likely to use the potential of social networking, and, all importantly, were more likely to donate money on-line.
So far, conventional wisdom is supported--the Obama campaign exploited the potential of the Internet especially for fundraising purposes and within the youngest political cohorts. Nevertheless, there are several counterpoints.
* Despite perceptions, there was a (slight) decline in the number of eligible voters who actually voted in 2008 compared to 2004 (See USA Today). Although the overall number of voters increased by 5 million, they were almost all minorities, especially African Americans. And, according to Pew, only 8% of all political internet users are African Americans (11% of the population). Thus, it is unclear that the Obama campaign's use of the Internet was crucial in motivating minority voters to go to the polls.
* Only 49% (up from 47% in 2004) of the much ballyhooed 18-24 age group voted. Under-30 voters (2:1 for Obama) were not critical to the result, except arguably in North Carolina and Indiana.
* Finally, all such studies have shown that political users of the Internet rapidly are moving away from websites with no point of view to those that reinforce their own political predisposition--preaching to the converted.
In my view, these findings make the parallels or lessons for German campaigns much less valid. I might even go so far to say that current U.S. trends are far from welcome or desirable. First, the youthful groups of voters (in both countries) most likely to use social networking sites are the least likely to vote and are not decisive for outcomes. Second, increased political Internet use is exacerbating political polarization and general nastiness. Indeed, there are real advantages to the much-derided "mainstream media" with real journalistic professionals maintaining their gatekeeping role and making efforts to achieve balance.
Third, I have not even mentioned the whole debate regarding "grassroots" versus "astroturf"--and the mounting evidence that the Obama campaign conveyed the illusion of bottom-up participation, but actually rather strongly controlled the message and used such technologies as another way of exerting top-down influence. If this is indeed the case, then the German parties' usage of the Internet is already up to "advanced" standards. Finally, the one real advantage that Obama had with the Internet--fundraising--is much, much less important in Germany in light of the generous public financing regime. In the U.S., the Internet has made the collection of money much easier and is helping to exacerbate the campaign finance inflation rate.
Thus, we ought to treat "Internet Manifestos" with a hefty dose of skepticism. At the least, we ought to subject assertions--that the Internet was the secret to Obama's success and that the anachronistic Germans should get with it--to real scrutiny. Perhaps the Internet is not the re-democratizing panacea that its acolytes have made it seem. Maybe there are advantages to a more old-school media approach and campaign style that the German parties still embody.
--Eric Langenbacher
Monday, September 21, 2009
The Traffic Lights in Germany Are Turned Off - and the Ship to Jamaica is Not Sailing
This weekend the Free Democrats and the Green Party held party conventions in Potsdam and Berlin to send a last-minute signal to voters before next Sunday’s election. Beyond the slogans “Germany Can Do Better” and “The Path Out of the Crisis is Green,” the main message of this weekend was about possible coalitions. As a consequence there is little room for maneuvering left if all parties keep their election promise.
The FDP voted unanimously in favor of a coalition with the CDU/CSU, ruling out a coalition with the SPD and the Greens (a so-called traffic light coalition) and leaving the door open for a Jamaica coalition with the CDU/CSU and the Greens. The Greens ruled out the Jamaica option and the SPD has promised not to form a coalition with the Left Party on the federal level. As a result, only two realistic options are left as outcomes for the election: either a center-right coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP, or a continuation of the current grand coalition - unless, of course, one party changes its mind after the election. As for now, this seems unlikely to me. Neither a traffic-light nor a Jamaica coalition was ever successfully tested on the state level. The FDP was invited to join a coalition with the SPD and the Greens after the last federal election but refused to do so. And as long as Steinmeier and Müntefering lead the SPD it is hard to see them in a government with their foe Oskar Lafontaine from the Left Party.
This situation leaves the Green/ SPD campaign in a strategic dilemma. The Greens have no real power option left, so how can they convince the many undecided voters to join their camp? The potential sympathizer could feel that his or her vote would be lost if the Greens end up in the opposition. Similarly, the Social Democrats will have difficulties arguing convincingly how Frank-Walter Steinmeier can become chancellor. All they can ask the voter for is to strengthen the SPD in yet another grand coalition, but the campaign message up until now was to end it and not to ask for a renewal of this pact. As for the FDP, they seem to know game theory and made a smart yet controversial move by betting everything on one option only. They put the electorate in a position in which they must decide to either vote for the relatively unpopular grand coalition – thus voting for the SPD – or in favor of change by voting for the Free Democrats.
And where does this leave Angela Merkel and her CDU/CSU? In her presidential way of campaigning she has not taken part in this game since under all of these options she will remain chancellor. Therefore she is attractive to those voters seeking stability but at the same time is threatened by a loss of votes to the SPD and the FDP. If this analysis turns out to be correct, she will still be the head of the government but her position as the leader of the CDU will be weakened.
--Tim Stuchtey
The FDP voted unanimously in favor of a coalition with the CDU/CSU, ruling out a coalition with the SPD and the Greens (a so-called traffic light coalition) and leaving the door open for a Jamaica coalition with the CDU/CSU and the Greens. The Greens ruled out the Jamaica option and the SPD has promised not to form a coalition with the Left Party on the federal level. As a result, only two realistic options are left as outcomes for the election: either a center-right coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP, or a continuation of the current grand coalition - unless, of course, one party changes its mind after the election. As for now, this seems unlikely to me. Neither a traffic-light nor a Jamaica coalition was ever successfully tested on the state level. The FDP was invited to join a coalition with the SPD and the Greens after the last federal election but refused to do so. And as long as Steinmeier and Müntefering lead the SPD it is hard to see them in a government with their foe Oskar Lafontaine from the Left Party.
This situation leaves the Green/ SPD campaign in a strategic dilemma. The Greens have no real power option left, so how can they convince the many undecided voters to join their camp? The potential sympathizer could feel that his or her vote would be lost if the Greens end up in the opposition. Similarly, the Social Democrats will have difficulties arguing convincingly how Frank-Walter Steinmeier can become chancellor. All they can ask the voter for is to strengthen the SPD in yet another grand coalition, but the campaign message up until now was to end it and not to ask for a renewal of this pact. As for the FDP, they seem to know game theory and made a smart yet controversial move by betting everything on one option only. They put the electorate in a position in which they must decide to either vote for the relatively unpopular grand coalition – thus voting for the SPD – or in favor of change by voting for the Free Democrats.
And where does this leave Angela Merkel and her CDU/CSU? In her presidential way of campaigning she has not taken part in this game since under all of these options she will remain chancellor. Therefore she is attractive to those voters seeking stability but at the same time is threatened by a loss of votes to the SPD and the FDP. If this analysis turns out to be correct, she will still be the head of the government but her position as the leader of the CDU will be weakened.
--Tim Stuchtey
Sunday, September 20, 2009
The ‘Internet Manifesto’: Media Coverage and Political Campaigning 2.0
German feuilletons are currently engaged in a heated debate on the role of mass media and politics in the era of Web 2.0. It has been ignited by the ‘internet manifesto’ published by the stars of the local blogosphere (such as Markus Beckedahl, Sascha Lobo) just in time for the conclusion of the election to the German Bundestag. The German successor to the famous ‘cluetrain manifesto’ comes up with 17 provoking theses on how journalism works today. A short recap:
Are mass media rendered unnecessary as users generate political content and citizens and politicians communicate directly via the Internet? This strategy does not (yet) add up: Even if the Internet comes in second as a medium for political information, no party attracts more than 70.000 supporters on popular social networks. In fact, a recent survey reveals that only 20 percent of politically interested users are planning to visit the homepage of a party or politician, and less than five percent of blog readers are interested in election related blogs. Considering a total base of 60 million voters, this represents just a tiny minority of the populace. Instead, 80 percent of politically interested users rely on the online sites of traditional mass media. Thus, the Internet has established a further channel for direct communication between citizen and politician and among citizens, but in light of current statistics, the gatekeeping role of mass media is clearly still in effect, both online and offline. If quality and large audience is what counts, mass media companies relying on a team of trained journalists, a marketing and sales force, and professional production equipment should firmly remain in the pole position. Amateurs may only win the competition in niche markets or in quick on-site or authentic coverage. Accordingly, the ‘constitutive role’ of the mass media for the German democracy seems unthreatened.
As suggested by the manifesto, the regulation of the Internet has become a major issue in the current election: the fierce debate on the “Netzsperrengesetz”, a law to ban internet sites due to child pornography, has been called the wake of the political consciousness of the German Internet community. Profiles on social networks of the CDU and SPD – the parties that passed the contended bill – are still packed with negative comments from the enraged Internet community. The Pirate Party has cashed in on the netizens’ resentment to the established German party scene. It focuses solely on Internet policy and basic digital rights, such as privacy of correspondence for emails, and communicates in Web 2.0-style. Referring to the number of online campaign supporters, the Pirate Party is even excelling over the otherwise leading CDU. Nonetheless, polls reckon only with a few percent for the Pirate Party in the election to the Bundestag.
Considering today’s status quo of politics and media in Germany, the Internet manifesto may be blown out of proportion. Considering future developments, however, it offers a thrilling and optimistic foresight.
--Kathi Wimmer
- There is no such thing as a gatekeeper on the internet: the compilation, classification and publication of content is no longer tied to “media companies, research centers, public institutions,” and barriers between amateurs and professionals are getting blurred. In other words, “the Internet is a pocket-sized media empire.”
- The Internet matches the paradigm of the process: while social networks conquer our everyday life top-down, distribution of standardized finished goods is replaced by infinite ‘multilogues’ and all content is constantly revised and only the “outstanding, credible and exceptional” attracts attention. “Quality remains the most important quality.”
- “The Internet is the new venue for political discourse”: It allows for the active political participation of the public and amplifies “freedom, both for the individual as well as society as a whole.” Hence, the open architecture of the Internet is the “basic IT law,” “copyright becomes a civic duty” and the freedom of the press is aimed at amateurs as well, it equals “freedom of opinion.”
Are mass media rendered unnecessary as users generate political content and citizens and politicians communicate directly via the Internet? This strategy does not (yet) add up: Even if the Internet comes in second as a medium for political information, no party attracts more than 70.000 supporters on popular social networks. In fact, a recent survey reveals that only 20 percent of politically interested users are planning to visit the homepage of a party or politician, and less than five percent of blog readers are interested in election related blogs. Considering a total base of 60 million voters, this represents just a tiny minority of the populace. Instead, 80 percent of politically interested users rely on the online sites of traditional mass media. Thus, the Internet has established a further channel for direct communication between citizen and politician and among citizens, but in light of current statistics, the gatekeeping role of mass media is clearly still in effect, both online and offline. If quality and large audience is what counts, mass media companies relying on a team of trained journalists, a marketing and sales force, and professional production equipment should firmly remain in the pole position. Amateurs may only win the competition in niche markets or in quick on-site or authentic coverage. Accordingly, the ‘constitutive role’ of the mass media for the German democracy seems unthreatened.
As suggested by the manifesto, the regulation of the Internet has become a major issue in the current election: the fierce debate on the “Netzsperrengesetz”, a law to ban internet sites due to child pornography, has been called the wake of the political consciousness of the German Internet community. Profiles on social networks of the CDU and SPD – the parties that passed the contended bill – are still packed with negative comments from the enraged Internet community. The Pirate Party has cashed in on the netizens’ resentment to the established German party scene. It focuses solely on Internet policy and basic digital rights, such as privacy of correspondence for emails, and communicates in Web 2.0-style. Referring to the number of online campaign supporters, the Pirate Party is even excelling over the otherwise leading CDU. Nonetheless, polls reckon only with a few percent for the Pirate Party in the election to the Bundestag.
Considering today’s status quo of politics and media in Germany, the Internet manifesto may be blown out of proportion. Considering future developments, however, it offers a thrilling and optimistic foresight.
--Kathi Wimmer
Friday, September 18, 2009
An Out-dated Format: The TV Debate and Its Alternatives
Nearly a week has passed since the German TV debate. Newspapers wrote about self-centered interrogators, a shy chancellor and a surprisingly persuasive but altogether still too weak vice chancellor. Many called the debate boring, others even useless. Particularly, it has been criticized that the debate was of no value due to the lack of the opposition leaders. Some pundits did not identify a clear winner but two losers (see Michael Weigl’s article). So who benefited from the debate? Furthermore, journalists as well as pundits expressed normative doubts: Is it reasonable to exclude the whole opposition? Are there better ways to inform people and to mobilize sympathizers?
First, why did the candidates agree to the actual format? Assume that Merkel and Steinmeier act rational and take the TV debate as a kind of game. The participants would not agree to the design if they didn’t benefit thereof. Moreover, they could be expected to make the best of the actual game. Here is the design: There are two candidates (Merkel and Steinmeier), four interrogators (two from the public and two from the private networks), 90 seconds per response and a total of 90 minutes. Every two interrogators ask every one question per policy issue. Both candidates may respond to the question as well as to the other candidate’s response. It is permitted but not obligatory to engage the rival in a debate.
But a controversy has not been taken place: The four (!) interrogators changed the subject all the time. Unlike the candidates, they acted quite aggressively and constantly interrupted Merkel and Steinmeier. The crucial point is that the interrogators did not act that “nasty” due to their personality but due to the debate's design – they tried to compensate the missing opposition. Defending themselves against the four journalists, Merkel and Steinmeier tended to cooperate with each other. For example, after Steinmeier's “nine percentages”-attack on Merkel and the FDP, the interrogator Kloeppel doubted Steinmeier's credibility in the matter of Afghanistan. Merkel could hardly attack Steinmeier on “Afghanistan”; she forgave him his previous attack. Altogether, the candidates were able to establish low-risk cooperative strategies thanks to the absence of the opposition leaders.
Actually, it is not likely that Merkel and Steinmeier were able to stir possible voters into action, due to the absence of real rivals. But face the alternative: Especially the presence of Westerwelle and Lafontaine would make low-risk strategies impossible. Considering Merkel’s and Steinmeier’s obvious risk aversion, they preferred the previous setting. In other words, the debate was designed best possible – at least from two candidates’ point of view. So it is no surprise that Merkel and afterwards Steinmeier canceled the so called Berliner Runde (a panel discussion with the party’s top politicians) as well.
Second, is such a TV debate desirable for the voting public? Important criteria for the public might be relevance and fairness. Though the candidates have been forced to be fair in dealing with each other, the debate has been unfair towards the opposition. And since no controversy has taken place, the TV debate has not been relevant as well.
Third, are there alternative formats that fulfill those criteria? There are: For instance, this week a radio competition took place. Listeners from all parts of Germany asked questions about different issues, especially concerning the youth (missing at the TV debate). Unlike the TV debate, Merkel and Steinmeier participated separately, Steinmeier on Tuesday and Merkel on Wednesday. But as they anyway would not engage each other in a debate, that did not make a difference. More important, they have neither been interrupted all the time nor been forced to defend the Grand Coalition. All in all, these interviews seemed to fit better in order to inform people.
Besides, the opposition leaders arranged two “small TV debates”, including only the small parties. Unlike the big TV debate, controversy has taken place. There have been only two interrogators who acted less aggressively. The format encouraged the participants to attack each other. Unfortunately, this program lacked public attention because is has not been announced as a “duel” between two possible chancellors.
Finally, the actual debate’s format seems out-dated. Maybe the era of German “duels” is over. Considering a political system that involves five important parties, there are two options for the next Bundestag election: Either replacing the debate by interviews – or allowing controversy by inviting the Liberals, the Greens and the Left as well.
--Oskar Fischer
First, why did the candidates agree to the actual format? Assume that Merkel and Steinmeier act rational and take the TV debate as a kind of game. The participants would not agree to the design if they didn’t benefit thereof. Moreover, they could be expected to make the best of the actual game. Here is the design: There are two candidates (Merkel and Steinmeier), four interrogators (two from the public and two from the private networks), 90 seconds per response and a total of 90 minutes. Every two interrogators ask every one question per policy issue. Both candidates may respond to the question as well as to the other candidate’s response. It is permitted but not obligatory to engage the rival in a debate.
But a controversy has not been taken place: The four (!) interrogators changed the subject all the time. Unlike the candidates, they acted quite aggressively and constantly interrupted Merkel and Steinmeier. The crucial point is that the interrogators did not act that “nasty” due to their personality but due to the debate's design – they tried to compensate the missing opposition. Defending themselves against the four journalists, Merkel and Steinmeier tended to cooperate with each other. For example, after Steinmeier's “nine percentages”-attack on Merkel and the FDP, the interrogator Kloeppel doubted Steinmeier's credibility in the matter of Afghanistan. Merkel could hardly attack Steinmeier on “Afghanistan”; she forgave him his previous attack. Altogether, the candidates were able to establish low-risk cooperative strategies thanks to the absence of the opposition leaders.
Actually, it is not likely that Merkel and Steinmeier were able to stir possible voters into action, due to the absence of real rivals. But face the alternative: Especially the presence of Westerwelle and Lafontaine would make low-risk strategies impossible. Considering Merkel’s and Steinmeier’s obvious risk aversion, they preferred the previous setting. In other words, the debate was designed best possible – at least from two candidates’ point of view. So it is no surprise that Merkel and afterwards Steinmeier canceled the so called Berliner Runde (a panel discussion with the party’s top politicians) as well.
Second, is such a TV debate desirable for the voting public? Important criteria for the public might be relevance and fairness. Though the candidates have been forced to be fair in dealing with each other, the debate has been unfair towards the opposition. And since no controversy has taken place, the TV debate has not been relevant as well.
Third, are there alternative formats that fulfill those criteria? There are: For instance, this week a radio competition took place. Listeners from all parts of Germany asked questions about different issues, especially concerning the youth (missing at the TV debate). Unlike the TV debate, Merkel and Steinmeier participated separately, Steinmeier on Tuesday and Merkel on Wednesday. But as they anyway would not engage each other in a debate, that did not make a difference. More important, they have neither been interrupted all the time nor been forced to defend the Grand Coalition. All in all, these interviews seemed to fit better in order to inform people.
Besides, the opposition leaders arranged two “small TV debates”, including only the small parties. Unlike the big TV debate, controversy has taken place. There have been only two interrogators who acted less aggressively. The format encouraged the participants to attack each other. Unfortunately, this program lacked public attention because is has not been announced as a “duel” between two possible chancellors.
Finally, the actual debate’s format seems out-dated. Maybe the era of German “duels” is over. Considering a political system that involves five important parties, there are two options for the next Bundestag election: Either replacing the debate by interviews – or allowing controversy by inviting the Liberals, the Greens and the Left as well.
--Oskar Fischer
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Sucked-empty Parties Going from Dull to Silly
Many observers had hoped that the eagerly anticipated Merkel-Steinmeier TV debate last Sunday would insert some freshness into the campaign, and at first it looked like it would. But it now turns out that instead, the battle for the Bundestag has just turned from dull to silly. And even though some observers might consider this progress, less cynical analysts are rubbing their eyes: what's happening?
It all started when Müntefering and Steinmeier, in an eager attempt to break out of the SPD's big strategic dilemma (i.e. the fact that the Social Democrats, given the polls numbers, are so far unable to explain how they intended to realistically win the chancellory for the SPD), publicly announced that a coalition of SPD, Greens, and the Free Democrats would now be their coalition of choice. Not only was this an unexpected twist -- it bordered on the ridiculous.
The SPD's main target in this campaign has so far has been the FDP. Steinmeier and his troops have tirelessly been trying to depict the FDP as being the very "neo-liberal" perpetrators whose ideologies have triggered the international financial crisis and who, if in power, would cripple the German welfare state and destroy social cohesion ("sozialer Kahlschlag"). But suddenly, on Tuesday and Wednesday, Müntefering and Steinmeier were musing about a three-way coalition including the Free Democrats, claiming that Westerwelle's party could cultivate a much stronger pro-business profile there than it could in a coalition with Merkel's CDU. What?
This last-minute attempt to recalibrate the SPD's campaign strategy, as understandable as it might be, illustrates the party's total desperation in the run-up to these elections. As the poll numbers fail to move upwards for the SPD (thereby shattering all hopes for a 2005-style eleventh-hour rally), the party is now embracing whatever phantastic short-term tactical manoeuvre promises some instant relief. To top it all off, on the same day, the SPD's popular finance minister, Peer Steinbrück, said in a video interview that the SPD should fight for a continuation of the grand coalition as it was the lesser risk for his party compared to losing power altogether. Even though there is some important truth in this, it was of course undermining Steinmeier's candidacy, and thus Steinbrück was forced to correct himself a few hours later. The damage was done, of course. Everybody was confused.
But also the CDU/CSU has provided its share of pre-election silliness. Horst Seehofer, the Bavarian CSU's strongman, announced yesterday that his party would soon present its own post-election "100-day-program" for economic growth -- without the CDU. The CDU had previously rejected Seehofer's idea to set up such a program together, claiming that it would irritate voters shortly ahead of election day.
To show such disharmony between the sister parties is of course highly unprofessional and potentially damaging. However, it illustrates the growing uneasiness within the CSU (and even parts of the CDU) about Merkel's content-free campaign. The deliberate strategy to neither attack nor provide too much substance is increasingly perceived as being too risky by conservatives. The move also shows how eagerly Seehofer is trying to get its Bavarian party back on track as the only viable political force in his home state. The CSU has never shied away from a certain kind of populism in order to cement and consolidate its still impressive power base in this southern German state. But it is of course too late now to credibly present a half-baked quick fix for the economy.
The episode serves as an indicator on how much in disarray the conservative camp in Germany is -- a fact long overshadowed by the publicly celebrated unravelling of the SPD. But it is not only the SPD that had its marrow sucked out of the party's backbone by this unwanted grand coalition. CDU and CSU will also be forced to embark on a thorough soul-search after the elections. As I said before in this blog: this might be a dull pre-election period. But boy, how interesting the post-election period will be!
It all started when Müntefering and Steinmeier, in an eager attempt to break out of the SPD's big strategic dilemma (i.e. the fact that the Social Democrats, given the polls numbers, are so far unable to explain how they intended to realistically win the chancellory for the SPD), publicly announced that a coalition of SPD, Greens, and the Free Democrats would now be their coalition of choice. Not only was this an unexpected twist -- it bordered on the ridiculous.
The SPD's main target in this campaign has so far has been the FDP. Steinmeier and his troops have tirelessly been trying to depict the FDP as being the very "neo-liberal" perpetrators whose ideologies have triggered the international financial crisis and who, if in power, would cripple the German welfare state and destroy social cohesion ("sozialer Kahlschlag"). But suddenly, on Tuesday and Wednesday, Müntefering and Steinmeier were musing about a three-way coalition including the Free Democrats, claiming that Westerwelle's party could cultivate a much stronger pro-business profile there than it could in a coalition with Merkel's CDU. What?
This last-minute attempt to recalibrate the SPD's campaign strategy, as understandable as it might be, illustrates the party's total desperation in the run-up to these elections. As the poll numbers fail to move upwards for the SPD (thereby shattering all hopes for a 2005-style eleventh-hour rally), the party is now embracing whatever phantastic short-term tactical manoeuvre promises some instant relief. To top it all off, on the same day, the SPD's popular finance minister, Peer Steinbrück, said in a video interview that the SPD should fight for a continuation of the grand coalition as it was the lesser risk for his party compared to losing power altogether. Even though there is some important truth in this, it was of course undermining Steinmeier's candidacy, and thus Steinbrück was forced to correct himself a few hours later. The damage was done, of course. Everybody was confused.
But also the CDU/CSU has provided its share of pre-election silliness. Horst Seehofer, the Bavarian CSU's strongman, announced yesterday that his party would soon present its own post-election "100-day-program" for economic growth -- without the CDU. The CDU had previously rejected Seehofer's idea to set up such a program together, claiming that it would irritate voters shortly ahead of election day.
To show such disharmony between the sister parties is of course highly unprofessional and potentially damaging. However, it illustrates the growing uneasiness within the CSU (and even parts of the CDU) about Merkel's content-free campaign. The deliberate strategy to neither attack nor provide too much substance is increasingly perceived as being too risky by conservatives. The move also shows how eagerly Seehofer is trying to get its Bavarian party back on track as the only viable political force in his home state. The CSU has never shied away from a certain kind of populism in order to cement and consolidate its still impressive power base in this southern German state. But it is of course too late now to credibly present a half-baked quick fix for the economy.
The episode serves as an indicator on how much in disarray the conservative camp in Germany is -- a fact long overshadowed by the publicly celebrated unravelling of the SPD. But it is not only the SPD that had its marrow sucked out of the party's backbone by this unwanted grand coalition. CDU and CSU will also be forced to embark on a thorough soul-search after the elections. As I said before in this blog: this might be a dull pre-election period. But boy, how interesting the post-election period will be!
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